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In the elementary works of our profession, we are told that
restraints and fetters upon the transmission and enjoyment of
property, are opposed to the policy and spirit of the common
law. No one can proceed far in his practice before he becomes
satisfied that this principle is not accepted as unqualifiedly by
the courts as he would be naturally led to suppose, from the
language in which it is communicated in the text-books.
Human nature is always the same. The selfish greed of many
is constantly seekingto perpetuate its sway beyond its own age
and generation, while the improvidence and imbecility of others
render it apparent, that their fortunes might better be subject
to any other commands than their own. Thus we are furnished
with the constant tendency toward, and the constant necessity
for, restraints of some kind, upon estates of every description.
The practitioner will be called upon to secure and limit the trans-
mission and enjoyment of property, according to the wishes of
his clients. The general rule against restraints and fetters,
which he has derived from his text-books, will afford an inade-
quate discharge of the responsibility imposed upon him by
their request. He should be ready to advise them to what
extent their wishes can be indulged and protected by the law
of the land. The imperfect manner in which, it is evident, this
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duty has been discharged by conveyancers, has induced the
write to collect the authorities upon the subject, and submit
some suggestions, which may possibly be of moment to the
profession; the ulterior aim of the writer (which will be ad-
verted to in the conclusion) being to ascertain, in what mode
an estate, created to the use of beneficiary, may be best sacured
to him against his own desire and inclination to dispose of it,
as well as against the rights and claims of others, the enforce-
ment of which may result in an involuntary disposition or
destruction of it.
1. In order to place the subject fully before the reader, it
will be necessary to allude to some of the changes which have
characterize the transmission of estates, in the law of England.
It is claimed by the old authors that an unlimited power
of alienation existed in England, in the time of the Saxons:
Wright's Tenures 154; Coke, 118 b., note a. by Thomas. It
is certainly impossible to give any well-founded reason, why,
in a normal state of society, property of any kind should be
materially restricted in its transmission and enjoyment. But
such was not the state of society under the feudal system,
which succeeded the overthrow of Saxon institutions. It was
unnatural and oppressive, and for that reason the reader should
not be surprised at finding the law upon this subject pre-
cisely the reverse of what it should be. Accordingly, we are
told, that the book of fiefs contained a general ordinance, that
the hand of him who wrote a deed of alienation should be
stricken off: 3 Kent Com. 506.
2. A genuine feud was inalienable without the lord's con-
sent. The tenant had only a usufructuary interest inthe soil,
without the power of alienation in prejudice of the lord or his
own heir. Fealty and escheat remained in the lord. The lat-
ter constituted a reversionary interest in the soil, upon which
rested the lord's right to object to any alienation of the estate,
which might tend to his prejudice. This severity of the feudal
system was diminished by the enactment of various statutes
from time to time, till in the reign of Edward the First, the
statute of quia emptores, enabled all persons except the king's.
tenants in capite to alienate their lands: 18 Ed. 1, c. 1.
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The restraints against alienation by devise, lasted much
longer. The statute of wills in the time of Henry the Eighth,
enabled all persons seized in fee simple, excepting persons not
suijuris, to devise two-thirds of their lands held in chivalry,
and the whole of those held in socage; 32 & 34 Hen. 8. This
power of devise was extended to all lands in the time of
Charles the Second, except copyholds, by the change of tenure
by Knight's service into socage tenure: 12 Car. 2. It was not
until the reign of George the First that personal property in
all parts of the kingdom was subjected to testamentary disposi-
tion: 2 Bl. Coim. 493. These enabling acts were not compre-
hensive enough in their provisions, so far as they related to
real estate, to restore to all estates the quality of unrestricted
alienation which is attributed to them now. But the courts
were not behind Parliament in these reforms; and they seem
to have accepted the different statutes upon this subject, as
sufficient justification for reversing the feudal rule against
alienation, and restoring in place thereof the common law
principle alluded to, which favors the transmission of real es-
tate, and applying it to estates which were not mentioned in
the enabling statutes.
3. The restraints which are now under discussion, fall natu-
rally into two classes, general or special, and they are directed
necessarily against the voluntary alienation and enjoyment o.
estates, or against their involuntary disposition by process of
law. By general restraint, is intended such a restriction as
proves co-extensive with the duration and enjoyment of the
estate granted or an approximation thereto. By special restraint,
the reader will understand such partial or limited abridgment
of the right of alienation and enjoyment, as will leave that
right not unreasonably impaired or curtailed. They will be
found consisting of almost ever conceivable form, such as in.
junctions directed against every mode of alienation, condi-
tions, covenants and limitations, operating indirectly against
the transfer and enjoyment of estates. They will be found
aatached to all manner of estates, freeholds, and for years, le-
gal and equitable.
4. Their effect when directed against the voluntary alien-
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ation of fee simple estates, will be first considered. It may be
accepted as the undoubted result of all the authorities, both
ancient and modern, that where the restraint is general in its
operation and effect, it is void when attached to a fee simple
estate. "A condition not to alien is void in a grant, release,
confirmation or any other conveyance whereby a fee simple
doth pass": Co. Litt. 223 a.; 2 Preston on Abr. 193; Wim-
bish v. Willoughby, Plow. 77; 1 Shep. Touch. 129; 4 Kent
Com. 131; Mc Williams v. Nisly, 2 S. & R. 513. It does not
matter in what form it is imposed. A mere injunction "not
to dispose of it for any pretext whatever," was held void
McDougal v. Brown, 21 Mo. 57. The like decision was pro-
nounced against a condition attached to a devise; that the de-
visee should not alienate: Reifsnyder v. Hunter, 7 Harris, Penn.
41. A restraint against alienation, until the estate which was
given to several devisees, should be assigned in severalty was
adjudged void, as too general and extended in its operation
There might never be such an assignment: Hale v. Tufts, 18
Pick. 455. A proviso attached to a fee, that the devisees
should not sell except to each other, is void as too general in its
effect: Schermerhorn v. Negus, 1 Denio 448. A similar con-
dition was held unobjectionable in an old case inEngland: Doe
v. Pearson, 6 East 173; a position which has been receded
from in the recent case of Atwater v. Atwater, 18 Beav. as be-
ing a departure from the law as laid down by Lord COKE. A
devise in fee to go over to another, if the devisee offered to
mortgage or suffer a fine or recovery, was held divested of the
condition: Ware v. Cann, 10 Barn. & Cress. 433. A devise to
children and their heirs as tenants -in common, with a gift over
to the survivor "in the event of any of them dying before hav-
ing heirs of their body or making a particular disposition of
his share," was declared to vest in fee, unaffected by the con-
dition : Greated v. Greated, 26 Beav. 621.
5. Where the estate to which the condition is attached con-
sists of what is known as a fee-farm estate, the rule against
restraints is the same. It will be remembered that the term
Fee simple originally indicated only the duration of an estate,
without reference to the tenure by which it was held. After
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the further creation of tenures in fee simple estates was pro.
hibited by the statute quid emtore8, the term came to repre-
sent as it now does in its popular sense, an estate to a man and
his heirs, exempt from all tenure. But in those States in which
this or similar statutes are not regarded as in force, an estate in
fee simple held upon an annual return of rent, may still be cre-
ated. And in respect to those estates it has been decided,
that all general restraints against their alienation and enjoy-
ment, are void as in other fee simple estates: DePeyster v
Michael, 6 N. Y. 497. The reasoning in the case last cited,
proceeds upon the assumption that the statute of quia emptores
was not in force in New York. It was subsequently decided
that this statute was in force there: lPanRemsela-er v. Hays,
19 N. Y. 68. But this conclusion does not affect the reason-
ing and force of the opinion in DePeyster v. Michael, as appli-
cable to such estates wherever they may exist. The right of
;he grantor to an annual rent in a fee farm estate, is not such
an interest in the land as will sustain the imposition of re-
straints against its alienation and enjoyment. The right to
the rent, or of entry for non-payment of rent, does not
amount to an estate in reversion, or an actual estate of any
kind: 4 Kent Com. 353; DePeyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 497;
Payn v. Beal, 4 Denio, 405.
6. In relation to estates tail, the same rule may be said to
prevail against restraints, which obtains in fee simple estates:
King v. Bushell, Amb. 379. It is true that in fee tail estates
the grantor has a reversion or fee simple expectant upon the
estate tail, a continuing estate in the soil, upon which the right
to fetter and restrain the alienation of real estates has been
rested by some: DePeyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 497. But this
distinction between fee simple and fee tail estates has not been
sufficient to induce a different rule. "No condition or limita-
tion, be it by act executed or by limitation of an use or by
devise in a last will, can bar tenant in tail, from aliening by
common recovery": Aildmay's Case, 6 Coke R. 40; Sanday's
Case, 9 Co. Rep. 128. There was nothing objectionable in a con.
dition attached to an estate tail, that the tenant in tail should
not hlien by deed, for this was prohibited by the statute de donis
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IWestminster 2, c. 1. But a common recovery was a method
of alienation which rose after the passage of this statute; and
it became a settled rule, that the tenant in tail could not be
restrained in any manner from barring the entail by this method
of transfer: Afary Partington's Case, 10 Co. R. 39; Fay v.
Hinde, Cro. Jac. 697; Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burrow 84. It was
also laid down by the old authors, that a condition attached
to an estate tail that the tenant in tail should not make a lease
for his own life was void, as repugnant to the nature of the
estate granted: Co. Litt. 223 b.; Roll. Abr. 418, Cond.
7. Conditions which operate as restri.tions upon the use and
enjoyment of fee simple estates, are void when arbitrary, unrea-
sonable or inconsistent with the nature of the estates granted,
as, for instance, that the feoffee shall not commit ivaste: Brooke's
Abr. Cond. 57, fol. 149; or that he should not receive the
profits: 1 Coke 206 b.; Afoore v. Savill, 2 Leon. 132. So also,
a restraint in a devise for charitable purposes, that the rents
should not be raised, was held void as unreasonable: Att'y
Gen. v. .fiaster of Cath Hall, Jacobs 381. A clause in a de-
vise directing that a certain portion of the laud given should
remain inseparably attached to the residue, and be held and
used for fuel only, was pronounced invalid: Smith v. Clark, .10
Md. 186. A devise to the testator's children, "in case they
continued to inhabit the town of II., otherwise not," was held
to vest free of the condition as unreasonable and repugnant:
Newkirk v. Newkirk, 2 Caines 345. To this class may be
added the case of Overbaugh v. Patrei, 8 Barb. 28, in which
a condition attached to a fee simple estate, requiring the grantoi
to pay one-fourth of all the purchase-money which he might
receive in any subsequent conveyance, was declared void.
8. The objection to general restraints against alienation, has
usually been urged in connection with estates in fee. The
around ofthe objection as already intimated, is more pointedly
set out byLord COKE. "For itis absurd and repugnant to rea.
son that he that hath no possibility to have the land revert to
him, should restrain his feoffee in fee simple of all powers to ali-
en :" Co. Litt.223, a. It was also objectedthatwherethe restraint
was general, being coextensive with the estate, it would con-
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travene the rule against perpetuities. Now, in respect to life
estates, neither of these objections have any foundation. After
the life estate the grantor still retains an estate in the land,
am] may be supposed not indifferent about its alienation and
enjoyment. As a restriction, when attached to a life estate,
it must necessarily be discharged within a period of time fall-
ing short of any violation of the rule against perpetuities.
Accordingly we find abundance of authorities in support of
restraints against the alienation of life estates, as being neither
opposed to the policy of the law nor repugnant to the nature
of the estate to whichthey were attached: 1 Co. Inst. 204,
223 b.; Platt on Coy. 404; Parry v. Harbart 1 Dyer, 45 b.;
"Jackson v. Silvernail, 15 John. 278; 2 Cruise Dig. 7-8; 34.
Williams v. Nisly, 2 S. & R. 307.
Restraints in the nature of fines upon alienation have been
held good in leases for life: Jackson v. Groat, 7 Cow. 285;
Livingston v. Stickly, 7 Hill 253.
The weight of authority and reason very probably concur in
allowing such restrictions attached to life estates, especially
when directed against voluntary alienation. But there is suffi-
cient authority opposed to the position, to render it extremely
hazardous for any conveyancer to rely upon it with any safety
or certainty: Rocheford v. ffavkman, 9 Hare 475; Dik v.
Pitchford, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 480; Brandon v. Robinson, 18
Ves. 429 ; Jfellvain v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45.
9. There seems to be no objection to general restraints
against the alienation and assignments of estates for years. It
is quite common to introduce them into leases for years, in
the shape of covenants and conditions: Platt on Coy. 401;
Taylor, Land. & T. 402; Church v. Brown, 15 Yes. 259.
10. Thus far, only restraints against voluntary alienation
have been considered. It is equally well settled that all gen-
eral restraints against involuntary alienation are in like man-
ner void, when annexed to fee simple estates. These restraints
usually take the form of attempted protection against the debts
and liabilities of the beneficiary. It has been decided that not-
withstanding a restriction against transfer and assignment,
the grantee's interest will pass to his assignee in bankruptcy
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Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429. A restriction, that the es-
tate shall not be subject to conveyance or attachment is void,
as against the policy of the law: Blackstqne Bank v. Davis, 21
Pick. 42. The same is true of a clause exempting the estate
from liability for debts: Grover v. Dolphin, 1 Sim. 66.
11. Some authorities in this country have gone the length
of sustaining provisions in trust estates, exempting the interest
of the beneficiaries from all debts and liabilities, where the
object of the trust did not extend beyond their maintenance
and support : Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle 33 ; Vaux v. Parker,
I W. & S. 19; Norris v. Johnson, 5 Barr, 287; Holdship v
Patterson, 7 Watts 547; Braman v. Stiles, 2 Pick. 440; 1
Wallace, Jr. 119 note; Ashurst v. Given, 5 W. & S. 323;
Pope v. Elliot, 8 B. Mon. 56; Perkins Y. Dickinson, 3 Gratt.
325 ; Eyrick v. Eyrick, 13 Penn. 491. Restrictions of this kind
are usually attached to life estates; but to whatever estate
they may be attached, they necessarily fall short of violating
the law against perpetuities, being directed against the debts
and liabilities of the beneficiary, and ceasing with his life. But
such exemptions are said to be opposed to the policy of the
law, which does not favor the enjoyment of estates exempt from
burdens and incidents of property. It is urged that creditors
are entitled to every right of property which their debtor may
possess or enjoy. These decisions cited by us are exceptional.
They meet with no support in the chancery law of England:
Green v. Spicer, 1 Rus. & Mfyl. 395; Ripon v. Norton, 2 Beav.
63; Snowdon v. Dales, 6 Sim. 524; Younghusband v. Gibson,
1 Coll. 400; Willis v. Hiscox, 4 Myl. & Or. 197; and the
weight of authority is against them in this country: Hallett v.
Thomson, 5 Paige 385; Rider v. Afason, 4 Sandf. Ch. 315;
AcIlvaine v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45; Hammersly v. Smith, 4
Whart. 126; Nickel v. Hanley, 10 Gratt. 336; Nicholson v.
3filler, w. Gratt. 334, 343. In some States there are statutes
which authorize the creation of such trusts: 1 Rev. Stat. N.
Y. 1836, p. 729, § 57.
12. The right in a grantor to exempt the interest of a bene-
ficiary of a trust, from the effects of involuntary alienation;.
has been maintained in a class of cases which will be found
